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COMMENTARY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. 1

The findings in "Lawyer Distress" are illuminating and, as the authors of this
very important study indicate, distressing. They show that a high percentage
of lawyers, relative to the general population, suffer from significant
psychological disorder and disposition to alcoholism.
It is clear to me that members of the legal profession are obliged to take these
findings seriously. I shall suggest below a few reservations about the analysis.
Nevertheless, the important findings are established by empirical evidence so
powerful that they can be ignored only through a wish not to believe. If the
findings are accepted as a description of reality, the challenge is to work out
sensible courses of action in response. The challenge is formidable.
The salient findings can readily be culled from the authors' discussion of the
source data and their statistical significance. Those of us who are not
quantitative social scientists should not be put off by the relatively technical
character of this supporting discussion. The discussion provides the
justification for treating the findings seriously -- a demonstrationby the authors
that the findings are indeed substantially accurate characteristics of the
population to which they refer. It is clear that conservative criteria are used for
identifying people who have personality disorders and alcohol problems. As
the Beck article notes, respondents are included in the "in trouble" category
only if statistically they are two standard deviations from the mean, i.e., in the
top 2.27% of the population that have these symptoms.2 In nontechnical terms,
this means these people were nearly "off the charts." By the same token, the
percentage of the lawyer population "in trouble" would be higher still if a less
conservative definition had been used. Personality disorders, as used in the
study, include: (1) Somatization (meaning physical manifestations of distress);
and (2) Obsessive-compulsive behavior. Feelings of personal inadequacy
include: (1) Depression; (2) Anxiety; (3) Hostility; and (4) Paranoia.
The key findings concerning personality disorders among lawyers are as
follows: (1) "Approximately 30% of the male lawyers score above the clinical
cutoff for interpersonal sensitivity, 28% for anxiety, 25% for social alienation
and isolation, 20% for depression, 20% for obsessive-compulsiveness, 13% for
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paranoid ideation, 7% for phobic anxiety, and 7% for hostility."3 (2)
"Approximately 27% of female lawyers score above the clinical cutoff for
interpersonal sensitivity, 20% for anxiety, nearly 20% for social alienation and
isolation, 16% for depression, 15% for obsessive-compulsive, and 11% for
hostility."4 (3) "Another conclusion that can be drawn is that, overall, an
alarming percentage of newly practicing lawyers are reporting a variety of
significant psychological distress symptoms well beyond that expected in a
normal population."5 (4) When faced with working in a predominantly
male-dominated field they [women lawyers] respond with anger rather than
6
depression."
The key findings concerning proneness to excessive use of alcohol are as
follows: (1) 20% of all male lawyers evidently have current alcohol problems.
For women lawyers the counterpart figure is about 10%.7 (2) Approximately
70% of all lawyers are "reporting" a lifetime likelihood of alcohol problems. 8
My reservations about the findings should now be stated. The principal
point concerns the validity of comparing lawyers with the general population,
rather than with a less inclusive population. In particular, lawyers could be
compared with other subsets of the general population who have similar
socio-economic demographics but who are in different lines of work. The
authors make reference to doctors, which is the kind of comparison I have in
mind. In the same vein, comparison could be made to people who have above
average intelligence and usually at least a college education, and who are in
vocations that are extremely competitive, impose heavy individual
responsibility, involve complex criteria for evaluation of performance, and
have wide variance in levels of achievement (hence, large opportunity for
failure). In addition to doctors this would include business executives,
entrepreneurs, financial analysts, college level academics, people in
advertising and public relations management, artists, etc.
Such a different basis of comparison would, I believe, indicate that similar
personality disorders and the proclivity to alcoholism are also manifested with
"abnormal" frequency in these groups. This is not to say that lawyers are
"normal" when compared with others in comparable lines of work, or that the
problems found in this study do not justify systematic response. It is to
recognize that there can be fallacy in using the general population as the frame
of reference in comparing a group whose members have self-selected
themselves into a highly competitive and emotionally "lonely" kind of work.
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The "average American" is a useful standard of comparison in many
demographic analyses, but perhaps not this one.
This said, the fact remains that lawyers evidently manifest, in substantially
disproportionate numbers, serious personality problems and proclivity for
alcohol abuse.
So what?
First, as regards alcohol, it is time that lawyers and judges recognize that
abuse of alcohol is a serious endemic occupational hazard in our profession.
This means, among other things, that:
(1) Lawyers individually must assume that they are at special risk of
succumbing to excessive use of alcohol. It should be a professional duty to
engage in self-examination in this respect and to establish the necessary
procedures. Quite specific rules can be imagined. For example, airline pilots
are prohibited from consuming alcohol less than twenty-four hours before a
flight. Some lawyers impose a similar regime on themselves during trial or
extended negotiations. Again, lawyers could be required to seek some kind of
outside help, for example through Alcoholics Anonymous, if their average
daily intake of alcohol equals or exceeds a specified amount, say the equivalent
of three "shots."
(2) Law firms must assume that about 20% of their professional staff actually
have significant problems with abuse of alcohol, either at present or in the
foreseeable future. Law firms could, as part of firm policy, impose the kinds of
restrictions mentioned above. Giving specific attention to substance abuse
could be made a specific part of law firm partners' managerial responsibilities.
Rule 5.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct could be expanded, for
example, to require firms to have procedures for detecting and responding to
alcohol abuse.
(3) Lawyers could be required to have a channel for communication, within
a firm or an association, from clients who detect what they perceive to be a
lawyer drunk or hung over.
(4) Judges could be required to report apparent intoxication on the job, on
the part of fellow judges.
(5) The disciplinary authorities could be directed to treat alcohol abuse as
always an aggravating factor, and a serious one at that. Any lawyer found twice
guilty of alcohol abuse could be suspended until proof of satisfactory
rehabilitation.
(6) Most important, intensive and continuing education on the subject could
be required. These days, the educational programs should also cover drug
abuse.
If this constitutes a heavy agenda, comparison could be made to treatment
of drunk driving in this country. Twenty years ago the prevailing sentiment
was, "Well, anyone can have a couple too many" Today there is wider
recognition that a "couple too many" results too often in people getting killed.
A lawyer who has had a "couple too many" can kill a client's cause.
The findings in this study suggest that abuse of alcohol is not only a cause
of professional malfunction but also a symptom of deeper personal problems
among the lawyer population. This takes us to the findings about personality
disorder.
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Here again I begin with a reservation about the study, in this case perhaps a
more serious one. The authors report an earlier study by Dr. Benjamin and other
colleagues that
followed law students longitudinally to ascertain whether students
entering law school were more distressed than the general population
or if the distress occurred as a result of attending law school. The
authors found that the prelaw students did not show significant
elevations of psychological distress when tested in the summer prior
to law school entry. Yet, within two months of beginning law school
the students'
psychological distress was found to be significantly
9
elevated.
The finding in the Benjamin study is taken as a beginning point in the present
study. That is, the high proportion of personality distress among lawyers,
particularly young ones, is considered to be a product of law school. The
present study, which addresses people who have already become lawyers,
assumes that this causal relation holds. Thus, the severe personality distress
reported in this study is attributed to law school and not to predisposing
characteristics of people who go to law school.
As indicated below, I am quite ready to accept that law schools and those
responsible for them, including myself, need to address the problem of
personality disorder openly and systematically. I regret to report that, without
doubt, as a law teacher I have inflicted much more distress than I should have.
This notwithstanding, I have tried over the years to modify my teaching
techniques away from the "Professor Kingsfield" model to which I was exposed
in law school.
However, I am extremely skeptical that the law school experience, as distinct
from predisposing characteristics of the young people who come to law school,
is the explanation for the widespread personality distress found among
lawyers. My skepticism aries from a lifetime of observing and interacting with
both law students and other young people. Put in general terms, law students
seem to me to be more concerned than others with ordering conduct by rules,
with treating people equally according to rules, with "injustice" in a more
general sense, with verbal abstractions, and with systems of authority and
people's places in such systems. A person with those sensitivities who grew up
in Germany or Japan would probably feel right at home. A person with those
sensitivities in this country would suffer chronic distress. It is my observation
that people having these sensitivities are inclined, in disproportionate
numbers, to come to law school because that is where attention focuses on rules,
justice, order, and authority, such as we have them in our culture.
From another viewpoint, however, it is irrelevant whether the high levels of
distress among lawyers are the product of predisposing "nature" or law school
"nurture." The fact remains that law people have high levels of distress. To the
extent that this condition is a product of existence prior to law school, as distinct
9
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from the exposure in law school itself, then effective amelioration would be
even more difficult to devise.
Hence, the question is what law schools can do. There is also a question of
what law firms can do for young lawyers in the apprenticeship years. One thing
is clear: For the present and foreseeable future, we lawyers should avoid our
typical response to trouble situations, which is to impose lots of new rules. The
phenomenon reported in this study is a complex phobic reaction to a regime
dominated by rule-consciousness. It would be bizarre, although certainly not
beyond imagination, that the profession would seek to deal with such a
phenomenon through additional rules.
Rather, the appropriate response strategy should be investigative and
experimental. The investigation should pursue more careful and systematic
analysis of the psychological dynamics in legal education. The experiments
should be modifications of technique in legal education. The conceptual
structure of both inquiry and experiment should be: What kinds of competence
should we seek to inculcate in young lawyers, and what kinds of dysfunction
should we seek to overcome or ameliorate? That is, the strategy has to be both
affirmative, "accent the positive," and exclusionary, "eliminate the negative."

As things stand, law school instruction is still largely modelled on the
Professor Kingsfield paradigm. Particularly is this true of instruction in the first
semester, when exemplification has its deepest and most lasting effect. Indeed,
the current system is as well modelled on the old Edward "Bull" Warren
paradigm, also associated with Harvard, "[1]ook to the left, look to the right,
one of you will not be here nextJune."10To an important extent legal education
today still calls for this "boot camp" technique, except that we keep all the
students.
Many law teachers express genuine concern about the brutalizing effects of
the traditional method, and try to do something about it. Many conscientious
law teachers no longer "do" the Socratic method or, worse, do it halfheartedly
-- generating almost the same distress but without the educational effect. Most
schools now have some version of small group instruction in the first year or
first semester, designed to change the "impersonal" character of the law school
experience. Many law schools now have "practice" oriented instruction, such
as clinical education, trial and appellate moot court, and negotiation moots.
Whether these reformative efforts are well constructed is another question.
Indeed, it is the question we must address.
However, it seems to me that efforts to ameliorate the distress inherent in
present legal education, and actually to improve the educational process if
possible, are impaired by unrecognized constraints and distracted by
unacknowledged agendas. Hard facts and ugly issues must be confronted.
First, law practice is highly stratified. Indeed, law practice is as highly
stratified as the socio-economic profile of our country, and not accidentally so.
We think and talk of our society as a democracy, and indeed such it is in many
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respects. Formal equality before the law and in civic relationships is a vital
political premise of our culture. Yet our society is also radically differentiated
in terms of incomes and, probably more important, privately held wealth. One
percent of our population receives about 25% of the collective annual personal
income. 11 These people are predominantly the entrepreneurs, managers, and
supporting cast for the business enterprises through which most of the
country's work is done. Excluding pension funds, barely more than one percent
of our population owns half the wealth in private hands in this country,
including financial assets and real property.12 These people are predominantly
the stockholders and bondholders of the business enterprises. 13 The pension
funds are managed by members of the managerial class.
Taken together, these people, business managers, entrepreneurs, and
"holders" are the most salient clientele of the legal profession. Only a relatively
small percentage of our profession directly serves this population.
Nevertheless, within the group of "corporate lawyers," broadly defined, there
are enormous differences in status, technical skill and monetary rewards. Other
sets of lawyers make their living by suing the managers and the holders, in
such types of litigation as products liability, environmental pollution,
stockholder and securities claims, etc. Others serve government agencies,
which are largely engaged in peace keeping (administration of criminal justice)
and regulating the managers and the holders. Other sets of lawyers handle
family practice that deals with legal problems of this middle and upper-middle
class, particularly residential real estate and divorce. That is, the economic
demographics of our society are also the demographics of our legal profession.
Yet we approach legal education as though it is training for a unitary
profession practicing in a democratic society. There are profound political
explanations for this dysfunction and profound political necessities for
continuing it as a methodology. But it gets in the way of clear thinking about
legal education.
Second, and as a result of its economic structure, law practice is highly
competitive. Indeed, compared with high level law practice, or even practice
in the middle range, there are no callings more competitive except Wall Street
finance (and we know how that is) and professional sports. The profession is
intensely competitive in a narrow sense in most litigation and much transaction
work. In many contexts, the competition is palpably political and ideological
as well, viz., the O.J. case. How should young players be prepared to deal with
this kind of competition or deal with the fact that most of them will not have
a chance even to try out for the major leagues?
Ido not think it helps for law professors and other social critics to decry the
situation and wish for a more humane world. Most people with a realistic
perception of the world simply shrug at this kind of critique. Most law students
11
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are realists in this respect. From that perspective the message is a pipedream:
Who actually believes there is any prospect that American society will be
fundamentally changed by the time this generation of law students has come
to maturity? So interpreted, the "humanist"message is one of complete despair
and will only generate greater psychological depression.
Legal academics now are themselves in this same system. Law practice is
stratified and intensely competitive. Therefore, legal education is stratified and
intensely competitive. How does a law school maintain and improve its
position in the stratified competition? The answer for most law schools has
been to do more and better of what the competition does. These days, the
competition believes that law has no inherent content. Hence law faculties do
something else, such as economics or politics or poetry, often badly.
And there we are. If we can accept the findings of this study, however, we
may be ready for the message given by the doctor at the end of Goodbye,
14
Columbus, "[n]ow we are ready to begin."
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